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Abstract
The ontological model framework provides a rigorous approach to ad-
dress the question of whether the quantum state is ontic or epistemic.
When considering only conventional projective measurements, auxil-
iary assumptions are always needed to prove the reality of the quantum
state in the framework. For example, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph the-
orem is based on an additional preparation independence assumption.
In this paper, we give a new proof of ψ-ontology in terms of protective
measurements in the ontological model framework. It is argued that
the proof needs not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and also applies
to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In addi-
tion, we give a simpler argument for ψ-ontology beyond the framework,
which is only based on protective measurements and a weaker criterion
of reality. The argument may be also appealing for those people who
favor an anti-realist view of quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
The nature of the quantum state has been a hot topic of debate since the
early days of quantum mechanics. A long-standing question is whether the
quantum state assigned to a single system represents the physical state of
the system or a state of (incomplete) knowledge about the physical state
of the system (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935). In recent years, the
framework of ontological models provides a rigorous approach to address this
question by formalizing the distinction between these two views, which are
referred to as ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic, respectively (Harrigan and Spekkens,
2010). Several theorems have also been proved to establish the ψ-ontic
view within the framework (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012; Colbeck
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and Renner, 2012; Hardy, 2013; Patra, Pironio and Massar, 2013)1. How-
ever, on the one hand, the ontological model framework is not very general,
and on the other hand, auxiliary assumptions are always required to prove
these ψ-ontology theorems, e.g. the preparation independence assumption
for the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem. It thus seems to be impossible
to completely rule out ψ-epistemic models for quantum mechanics with-
out auxiliary assumptions. Indeed, by removing the assumptions of these
ψ-ontology theorems, explicit ψ-epistemic models can be constructed to re-
produce the statistics of quantum measurements in Hilbert spaces of any
dimension (Lewis et al, 2012; Aaronson et al, 2013).
In this paper, we will give a new argument for ψ-ontology in terms of
protective measurements, first in the ontological model framework and then
beyond the framework. Protective measurements are distinct from projec-
tive measurements in that a protective measurement can directly obtain the
expectation value of the measured observable in the measured state with cer-
tainty (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman,
1993), while a projective measurement can only obtain one of the eigenval-
ues of the measured observable with certain probability in accordance with
the Born rule. As a consequence, the existence of protective measurements
will extend the ontological model framework, and provide more resources
for proving the reality of the quantum state.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give a concise
introduction to protective measurements. It is shown that the appearance
of expectation value as a measurement result is quite natural when the mea-
sured state is not changed during the measurement as for protective mea-
surements. In Section 3, we present a new, rigorous proof of ψ-ontology in
the extended ontological model framework which includes protective mea-
surements. The proof needs not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and also
applies to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In
Section 4, we further improve the ontological model framework by replacing
one of its fundamental assumptions with a more reasonable one. We argue
that although the proofs of existing ψ-ontology theorems cannot go through
under this new assumption, our proof is still valid. In Section 5, we replace
the ontological model framework with a weaker criterion of reality, which
is arguably an improved version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen criterion
of reality, and give a simpler argument for ψ-ontology based on protective
measurements and this criterion of reality. Conclusions are given in the last
section.
1For a comprehensive review of these ψ-ontology theorems and related work see Leifer
(2014).
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2 Protective measurements
The existing ψ-ontology theorems and ψ-epistemic models are both based on
an analysis of conventional projective measurements2. However, there are
in fact other types of quantum measurements, one of which is the important
but seemingly less-known protective measurements (Aharonov and Vaid-
man, 1993; Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman, 1993). During a protective
measurement, the measured state is protected by an appropriate mechanism
such as via the quantum Zeno effect, so that it neither changes nor becomes
entangled with the state of the measuring device. In this way, such protec-
tive measurements can measure the expectation values of observables on a
single quantum system, even if the system is initially not in an eigenstate of
the measured observable, and the quantum state of the system can also be
measured as expectation values of a sufficient number of observables.
By a projective measurement on a single quantum system, one obtains
one of the eigenvalues of the measured observable, and the expectation value
of the observable can only be obtained as the statistical average of eigen-
values for an ensemble of identically prepared systems. Thus it seems sur-
prising that a protective measurement can obtain the expectation value of
the measured observable directly from a single quantum system. In fact,
the appearance of expectation value as a measurement result is quite natu-
ral when the measured state is not changed during the measurement as for
protective measurements (Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman, 1993). In this
case, the evolution of the combining state is
|ψ(0)〉 |φ(0)〉 → |ψ(t)〉 |φ(t)〉 , t > 0 (1)
where |ψ〉 denotes the state of the measured system and |φ〉 the state of
the measuring device, and |ψ(t)〉 is the same as |ψ(0)〉 up to a phase factor
during the measurement interval [0, τ ]. The interaction Hamiltonian is given
by HI = g(t)PA, where A is the measured observable, P is the conjugate
momentum of the pointer variable X of the device, and the time-dependent
coupling strength g(t) is a smooth function normalized to
∫
dtg(t) = 1 during
the measurement interval τ , and g(0) = g(τ) = 0. Then by Ehrenfest’s
theorem we have
d
dt
〈ψ(t)φ(t)|X |ψ(t)φ(t)〉 = g(t)〈ψ(0)|A |ψ(0)〉 , (2)
which further leads to
〈φ(τ)|X |φ(τ)〉 − 〈φ(0)|X |φ(0)〉 = 〈ψ(0)|A |ψ(0)〉 . (3)
2It is worth emphasizing that the existing ψ-epistemic models reproduce only the statis-
tics of conventional projective measurements, not yet the outcomes of protective measure-
ments (Spekkens, 2007; Lewis et al, 2012; Aaronson et al, 2013).
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This means that the shift of the center of the pointer of the device gives the
expectation value of the measured observable in the measured state. This
analysis also shows that a protective measurement obtaining an expectation
value is independent of the protection procedure.
That the quantum state of a single system can be measured by protective
measurements can also be illustrated with a specific example (Aharonov and
Vaidman, 1993). Consider a quantum system in a discrete nondegenerate
energy eigenstate ψ(x). In this case, the measured system itself supplies
the protection of the state due to energy conservation and no artificial pro-
tection is needed. We take the measured observable An to be (normalized)
projection operators on small spatial regions Vn having volume vn:
An =
{
1
vn
, if x ∈ Vn,
0, if x 6∈ Vn.
(4)
An adiabatic measurement of An then yields
〈An〉 = 1
vn
∫
Vn
|ψ(x)|2dv, (5)
which is the average of the density ρ(x) = |ψ(x)|2 over the small region Vn.
Similarly, we can adiabatically measure another observable Bn =
~
2mi(An∇+
∇An). The measurement yields
〈Bn〉 = 1
vn
∫
Vn
~
2mi
(Ψ∗∇Ψ−Ψ∇Ψ∗)dv = 1
vn
∫
Vn
j(x)dv. (6)
This is the average value of the flux density j(x) in the region Vn. Then when
vn → 0 and after performing measurements in sufficiently many regions Vn
we can measure ρ(x) and j(x) everywhere in space. Since the quantum state
ψ(x, t) can be uniquely expressed by ρ(x, t) and j(x, t) (except for an overall
phase factor), the above protective measurements can obtain the quantum
state of the measured system.
3 My argument
Since the quantum state can be measured from a single system by a series of
protective measurements, it seems natural to assume that the quantum state
refers directly to the physical state of the system. Several authors, includ-
ing the discoverers of protective measurements, have given similar arguments
supporting this implication of protective measurements for the ontological
status of the quantum state (Aharonov and Vaidman 1993; Aharonov, Anan-
dan and Vaidman 1993; Anandan 1993; Dickson 1995; Gao 2013, 2014a;
Hetzroni and Rohrlich 2014). However, these analyses are not very rigorous
and also subject to some objections (Unruh 1994; Dass and Qureshi 1999;
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Schlosshauer and Claringbold 2014)3. It is still debatable whether protec-
tive measurements imply the reality of the quantum state. In the following,
we will give a new, rigorous argument for ψ-ontology in terms of protective
measurements in the ontological model framework.
The ontological model framework is based on two fundamental assump-
tions (Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012).
The first one is that if a quantum system is prepared such that quantum the-
ory assigns a pure state, then after preparation the system has a well-defined
set of physical properties, which is usually represented by a mathematical
object, λ. This assumption is necessary for the analysis of the ontological
status of the quantum state, since if such physical properties don’t exist,
it will be meaningless to ask whether or not the quantum state describes
them. The second assumption is that when a measurement is performed,
the behaviour of the measuring device is only determined by the complete
physical state of the system, along with the physical properties of the mea-
suring device. For a projective measurement M , this assumption means that
the physical state or ontic state λ of a system determines the probability
p(k|λ,M) of different outcomes k for the measurement M on the system.
While for a protective measurement, this assumption will mean that the
ontic state λ of a system determines the definite result of the protective
measurement on the system. In this way, the ontological model framework
is enlarged by including protective measurements, and it also applies to the-
ories in which the Born probability is not determined by the ontic state of
the measured system, such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory (see also Drezet,
2015).
Based on these assumptions, we can give an rigorous argument for ψ-
ontology in terms of protective measurements. We first use the proof strat-
egy of existing ψ-ontology theorems, namely first assuming that two different
quantum states are compatible with the same ontic state, and then proving
the consequences of this assumption are inconsistent with the predictions of
quantum mechanics. The argument is as follows. For two different quan-
tum states such as two nonorthogonal states, select an observable whose
expectation values in these two states are different. For example, consider
a spin half particle. The two nonorthogonal states are |0〉 and |+〉, where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), and |0〉 , |1〉 are eigenstates of spin in the z-direction.
As Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman (1993) showed, a spin state can be
protected by a magnetic field in the direction of the spin. Let B0, B+ be
protecting fields for the states |0〉, |+〉, respectively, and let the measured
observable be P0 = |0〉 〈0|. Then the protective measurements of this ob-
servable on these two nonorthogonal states yield results 1 and 1/2, respec-
tively. Although these two nonorthogonal states need different protection
procedures, the protective measurements of the observable on the two (pro-
3See Gao (2014b) for a brief review of and answers to these objections.
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tected) states are the same, and the results of the measurements are different
with certainty. If there exists a probability p > 0 that these two (protected)
quantum states correspond to the same ontic state λ, then according to the
assumptions of the ontological model framework, the results of the protective
measurements of the observable on these two states will be the same with
probability not smaller than p. This leads to a contradiction. Therefore,
two (protected) quantum states correspond to different ontic states4. By
assuming that whether an unprotected state or a corresponding protected
state is prepared, the probability distribution of the ontic state λ is the
same, which is an inference of the preparation noncontextuality assumption
(Spekkens, 2005; Leifer, 2014), we can further reach the conclusion that
two (unprotected) quantum states also correspond to distinct ontic states.
In other words, the quantum state represents the physical state of a single
system.
A similar argument can also be given in terms of realistic protective
measurements. A realistic protective measurement cannot be performed on
a single quantum system with absolute certainty. For a realistic protective
measurement of an observableA, there is always a small probability to obtain
an outcome different from 〈A〉. In this case, according to the assumptions
of the ontological model framework, the probability of different outcomes
will be determined by the ontic state of the measuring device and the re-
alistic measuring condition such as the measuring time, as well as by the
ontic state of the measured system5. Now consider two (protected) quantum
states, and select an observable whose expectation values in these two states
are different. Then we can perform the same realistic protective measure-
ments of the observable on these two states. The overlap of the probability
distributions of the results of these two measurements can be arbitrarily
close to zero when the realistic condition approaches the ideal condition (In
the limit, each probability distribution will be a Dirac δ−function localized
in the expectation value of the measured observable in the measured state,
and it will be determined only by the ontic state of the measured system).
If there exists a non-zero probability p that these two quantum states cor-
respond to the same ontic state λ, then since the same λ yields the same
probability distribution of measurement results under the same measuring
condition according to the ontological model assumptions, the overlap of
the probability distributions of the results of protective measurements of
the above observable on these two states will be not smaller than p. Since
4This result is not surprising, since two (protected) quantum states of a single system
can be distinguished with certainty by protective measurements.
5Similarly, the probability of different outcomes of a realistic projective measurement
will be also determined by the ontic state of the measuring device and the measuring time,
as well as by the ontic state of the measured system. As we will see later, the existing
ψ-ontology theorems will be difficult or even impossible to prove for realistic projective
measurements.
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p > 0 is a determinate number, this leads to a contradiction6. Therefore,
two (protected) quantum states correspond to different ontic states, and so
do two (unprotected) quantum states by the preparation noncontextuality
assumption.
The above argument, like the existing ψ-ontology theorems, also needs
to be based on an auxiliary assumption, the preparation noncontextuality
assumption this time7. However, the argument can be further improved to
avoid this auxiliary assumption. The key is to notice that the result of a
protective measurement depends only on the measured observable and the
ontic state λ of the measured system. If the result is also determined by
other factors such as the ontic state of the measuring device or the protection
setting, then the result may be different for the same measured observable
and quantum state. This contradicts the predictions of quantum mechanics,
according to which the result of a protective measurement is always the ex-
pectation value of the measured observable in the measured quantum state.
Now consider two (unprotected) quantum states, and select an observable
whose expectation values in these two states are different. The results of the
protective measurements of the observable on these two states are different
with certainty. If there exists a probability p > 0 that these two quantum
states correspond to the same ontic state λ, then according to the above
analysis, the results of the protective measurements of the observable on
these two states will be the same with probability not smaller than p. This
leads to a contradiction. Therefore, two distinct quantum states correspond
to different ontic states.
We can also give a direct argument for ψ-ontology in terms of protective
measurements, which is not based on auxiliary assumptions either. As ar-
gued above, the result of a protective measurement is determined only by the
measured observable and the ontic state λ of the measured system. Since
the measured observable also refers to the measured system, this further
means that the result of a protective measurement, namely the expectation
value of the measured observable in the measured quantum state, is deter-
mined only by the realistic properties of the measured system. Therefore,
the expectation value of the measured observable is also a realistic property
of the measured system. In other words, the expectation value of an observ-
6Note that it is indeed true that for any given realistic condition one can always assume
that there exists some probability p that the two measured quantum states correspond to
the same ontic state λ. However, the point is that if the unitary dynamics of quantum
mechanics is valid, the realistic condition can always approach the ideal condition arbi-
trarily closely, and thus the probability p must be arbitrarily close to zero, which means
that any ψ-epistemic model with finite overlap probability p is untenable. Certainly, our
argument will be invalid if quantum mechanics breaks down when reaching certain realistic
condition.
7Since the above argument only considers single quantum systems and makes no appeal
to entanglement, it avoids the preparation independence assumption for multiple systems
used by the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012).
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able is a realistic property of a single quantum system. Since a quantum
state can be constructed from the expectation values of a sufficient number
of observables, the quantum state is also real.
4 With more strength
The above arguments for ψ-ontology, like the existing ψ-ontology theorems,
are also based on the second assumption of the ontological model framework,
which says that for a protective measurement the ontic state of a physical
system immediately before the measurement determines the outcome of the
measurement, whether the ontic state changes or not during the measure-
ment. However, this is certainly a simplified assumption. A more reasonable
assumption is that the ontic state of a physical system may evolve in a cer-
tain way during a protective measurement, and the measurement outcome
is determined not only by the initial ontic state but also by the total evo-
lution of the ontic state during the measurement. Similarly, it is the total
evolution of the ontic state of a system during a projective measurement
determines the probability of different outcomes for the measurement. Cer-
tainly, if the measuring interval is extremely short and the change of the
ontic state is continuous, then the ontic state will be almost unchanged dur-
ing the measurement, and thus the original simplified assumption will be
still valid. However, if the change of the ontic state is not continuous but
discontinuous, then even during an arbitrarily short time interval the ontic
state may change greatly, and thus the original, simplified assumption will
be invalid.
Unfortunately, the proofs of existing ψ-ontology theorems such as the
Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem will not go through under this more rea-
sonable assumption. The reason is that under this assumption, even if two
nonorthogonal states correspond to the same ontic state initially, they may
correspond to different evolution of the ontic state, which may then lead
to different probabilities of measurement outcomes. Then the proofs of the
ψ-ontology theorems by reduction to absurdity cannot go through. In a sim-
ilar way, the above arguments in terms of protective measurements, which
use the proof strategy of existing ψ-ontology theorems, will be also invalid
under this more reasonable assumption.
However, the direct argument for ψ-ontology in terms of protective mea-
surements can still go through under the new assumption. First, according
to this assumption, the evolution of the ontic state of a physical system
during a protective measurement determines the result of the protective
measurement, namely the expectation value of the measured observable in
the measured quantum state. Next, since the quantum state of the system
keeps unchanged, the evolution of the ontic state of the system is still com-
patible with the quantum state. This means that even when the system
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being in the quantum state is not measured, its ontic state may also evolve
in this way and such evolution is then a realistic property of the system.
Therefore, the expectation value of the measured observable is determined
by a realistic property of the measured system, and it is also a realistic
property of the system. Then similar to the direct argument given in the
last section, we can also prove the reality of the quantum state.
5 A weaker criterion of reality
The first fundamental assumption of the ontological model framework is that
a quantum system has a well-defined set of realistic properties (Harrigan
and Spekkens, 2010; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012). The existing ψ-
ontology theorems, as well as the above arguments in terms of protective
measurements, are all based on this realistic assumption. If one drops this
assumption as anti-realists would like to do, then one can still restore the
(non-realist) ψ-epistemic view or assume another non-realist view. In this
section, we will give an argument for the reality of the quantum state based
not on this realistic assumption but on a weaker criterion of reality. The
analysis is beyond the ontological model framework.
The suggested criterion of reality is: if a certain observation of a phys-
ical system obtains a definite outcome, which is determined by a mathe-
matical quantity assigned to the system by a theory, and the quantity does
not change during the observation, then the system has a definite, realistic
property represented by that quantity according to the theory8. This cri-
terion of reality provides a definite link from the mathematical quantities
in a realistic theory to the realistic properties of a physical system via ex-
perience or measurements. By using this criterion of reality to analyze the
ontological content of a theory such as the ontological status of the quantum
state in quantum mechanics, we need not care about the underlying ontic
state of a physical system and its possible dynamics during a measurement.
Here is the analysis. A protective measurement on a physical system yields
a definite outcome, the expectation value of the measured observable in
the measured quantum state. This outcome is determined by the quantum
state, a mathematical quantity assigned to the measured system, and the
quantum state also keeps unchanged during the measurement. Therefore,
according to the suggested criterion of reality, the system has a definite,
realistic property represented by the quantum state. This proves the reality
8This criterion of reality improves the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen criterion of reality in
that it avoids the requirement of “without in any way disturbing a system”, which is
difficult or even impossible to justify (as we don’t know the underlying ontic state of the
measured system and its possible dynamics during a measurement before the analysis
using the criterion of reality), and replaces it with a more reasonable condition that
the measured quantity does not change during the measurement, whose validity can be
precisely determined by a realist theory.
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of the quantum state.
Since the above criterion of reality does not necessarily require that a
quantum system have realistic properties, it is weaker than the realistic as-
sumption of the ontological model framework. Even though some people
refuse to attribute realistic properties to quantum systems, they may well
accept this criterion of reality. On the one hand, this criterion of reality
perfectly applies to classical mechanics, and one can use it to get the antic-
ipant ontological content of the theory. On the other hand, people usually
think that this criterion of reality cannot be applied to quantum mechanics
in general (though it can certainly apply to the measurements of eigenstates
of an observable), and thus it does not influence the non-realist views of
the theory. However, the existence of protective measurements must be a
surprise for these people. It will be interesting to see whether some anti-
realists will reject this criterion of reality based on the existence of protective
measurements.
Certainly, one can also restore the (non-realist) ψ-epistemic view by re-
jecting the above criterion of reality. However, there is a good reason why
this is not a good choice. It is arguably that a reasonable, universal criterion
of reality, which may provide a plausible link between theory and reality via
experience, is useful or even necessary for realist theories. The criterion of
reality is not necessarily complete, being able to derive all ontological con-
tent of a theory, which seems to be an impossible task. However, we can
at least derive the basic ontological content of a realist theory by using this
criterion of reality. If one admits the usefulness and universality of such a
criterion of reality, then the similarity between classical measurements and
protective measurements will require that if one assumes a realist view of
classical mechanics, admitting the ontological content of the theory derived
from the suggested criterion of reality, then one must also admit the onto-
logical content of quantum mechanics derived from this criterion of reality,
such as the reality of the quantum state. The essential point is not that
the suggested criterion of reality must be true, but that if we accept the
usefulness and universality of such a criterion of reality and apply it to clas-
sical mechanics and macroscopic objects to derive the anticipant classical
ontology, we should also apply it to quantum mechanics and microscopic
objects to derive the unexpected quantum ontology, no matter how strange
it is. Otherwise we will have to divide the world into a quantum one and
a classical one artificially, and we will not have a unified world view as a
result.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new, rigorous proof of ψ-ontology in terms of pro-
tective measurements. The analysis improves the previous work in several
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aspects. First of all, we extend the ontological model framework by intro-
ducing protective measurements, and prove the reality of the quantum state
in this framework without relying on auxiliary assumptions. This provides
a stronger ψ-ontology theorem. Moreover, the extended ontological model
framework also applies to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm
theory, so does our proof of ψ-ontology in the framework. Next, we further
improve the ontological model framework by replacing one of its fundamen-
tal assumptions with a more reasonable one. We argue that although the
proofs of existing ψ-ontology theorems cannot go through under the new
assumption, our proof is still valid. Lastly, we replace the ontological model
framework with a weaker criterion of reality, and give a simpler argument
for ψ-ontology based on protective measurements and this criterion of re-
ality. The argument may be also appealing for some people who favor an
anti-realist view of quantum mechanics.
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